Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Driving Behavior by Mürmann, Alexander et al.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Alexander Mürmann and Alois Geyer and Daniela Kremslehner





Mürmann, Alexander and Geyer, Alois and Kremslehner, Daniela (2019) Asymmetric Information in
Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Driving Behavior. Journal of Risk and Insurance. pp. 1-27.
ISSN 1539-6975
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/6807/
Available in ePubWU: January 2019
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the publisher-created published version.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
© 2019 The Authors Journal of Risk and Insurance published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf
of American Risk and Insurance Association (2019).
DOI: 10.1111/jori.12279
Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance:





Based on a unique data set of driving behavior we test whether private in-
formation in driving characteristics has significant effects on contract choice
and risk in automobile insurance. We define a driving factor based on over-
all distance driven, number of car rides, and speeding. Using local weather
conditions, we account for the endogeneity of the driving factor. While this
driving factor has an effect on risk, there is no significant evidence for se-
lection effects in the level of third-party liability and first-party insurance
coverage.
Introduction
This article provides new insights into the relevance of private information in insur-
ance markets based on a telematic data set of insured cars that is inaccessible to the
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insurance company.1 The data set contains detailed information about driving be-
havior2 (e.g., speed, distance driven, and road type) for policyholders who opted for
a pay-as-you-drive contract. While the insurance company uses the aggregate dis-
tance driven for the premium calculation, it contractually refrains from accessing any
other telematic data.3 In addition, we also have access to the corresponding insurance
data set that includes all variables used for pricing, policyholders’ contract choice
(third-party liability and first-party coverage), and information about the submission
of liability claims. We link this insurance data set to the telematic data set on the car
level. As all information, except distance, contained in the telematic data is unob-
served by the insurance company, we can directly test whether private information
about driving behavior is relevant for and how it is linked to the policyholder’s choice
of the insurance contract and the conditional loss distribution.
Controlling for the risk classification of the insurance company, we test whether driv-
ing characteristics have an effect on the choice of third-party liability and first-party
coverage and/or an effect on a subsequent downgrade of the Bonus-Malus class.4
We use the overall distance driven, the number of car rides, the interaction between
the two, and a speeding index to define a driving factor. These driving character-
istics may both determine contract choice (selection effect) and be affected by con-
tract choice (incentive effect), and thus be endogenous. We use weather conditions
(including precipitation, temperature, snowfall) observed after contract choice but
while driving is recorded as instruments. Using detailed telematics data we identify
the main location of the car and match it locally with information from 150 weather
stations. Thereby, we make it possible to disentangle selection effects and incentive
effects.
Our results show that both overall distance (as observed by the insurance company)
and the driving factormentioned above (based on additional private information that
is not accessible to the insurance company) increase the likelihood of a downgrade of
theBonus-Malus class. The coefficient’s test statistic is closebut below theusual critical
values, though.5 These driving characteristics do not affect policyholders’ contract
1“Telematics” stands for the fusion of “telecommunication” and “informatics.” It is typically
based on a GPS device that allows for the transmission of information about moving objects,
for example, as used in navigation systems.
2Data are recorded approximately every 2 km (1.24 miles) by a telematic device that is installed
in the insured car.
3The production and installation of the hardware into the cars as well as the collection and
management of the telematic data are carried out by an independent telematic company.
4Premiums for third-party liability insurance are based on an experience rating system. A
downgrade of the Bonus-Malus class is triggered by the submission of at least one liability
claim during one year and results in a higher premium for the following year. We use such a
downgrade in the year following the beginning of our telematic data as a proxy for risk.
5Robustness checks below show that excluding speeding from the set of driving characteristics
increases both the coefficient and its statistical significance on adowngrade of theBonus-Malus
class. This suggests that distance and the number of car rides are more important risk factors
than speeding.
Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Driving Behavior 3
choice.6 Thus, while distance and the driving factor are plausible and potential risk
factors, we find insufficient evidence for relevant selection effects with respect to
insurance coverage.
Most of the empirical literature on asymmetric information in insurancemarkets ana-
lyzes insurance data alone and tests for the sign of the correlation between the level of
insurance coverage and ex post realizations of risk controlling for the risk classification
of the insurance company. The classical models both of adverse selection and moral
hazard (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1974; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Harris and Raviv,
1978; Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979) are based on one-dimensional private infor-
mation and predict a positive correlation. This prediction has been confirmed in the
health insurance market (Cutler and Reber, 1998; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998) and
in the annuity market (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004, 2014; McCarthy and Mitchell,
2010). However, there is also evidence for a negative correlation between the level of
insurance coverage and claims probability in the markets for life insurance (Cawley
and Philipson, 1999; McCarthy andMitchell, 2010) and for Medigap insurance (Fang,
Keane, andSilverman, 2008).Moreover, no statistically significant correlationhas been
found in automobile insurance (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; Dionne, Gouriéroux,
and Vanasse, 2001; Cohen, 2005)7 and in long-term care insurance (Finkelstein and
McGarry, 2006).8
Chiappori et al. (2006) examine the extent to which models of adverse selection and
moral hazard can be generalized while still predicting a positive correlation between
the chosen level of insurance coverage and the expectedvalue of indemnity.9 They em-
phasize that hidden degree of risk aversion can be pivotal for violating the prediction
of positive correlation. de Meza and Webb (2001) show that a separating equilibrium
with a negative relation between coverage and accident probability can exist if hidden
information about the degree of risk aversion is combined with hidden investment
in risk reduction, and if insurance contracts entail administrative costs. Finkelstein
and Poterba (2014) also argue that if asymmetric information is present on multiple
characteristics, including the degree of risk aversion, then the result of rejecting (not
rejecting) the hypothesis of nondependence between the level of insurance coverage
and risk may not be indicative of the existence (absence) of asymmetric information.
Cohen and Einav (2007) develop a structural model that accounts for unobserved
heterogeneity in both risk and risk aversion. By using a large data set of an Israeli
6The signs show an insignificant negative effect on the level of third-party liability coverage,
indicating advantageous selection, and an insignificant positive effect on the level of first-party
coverage, indicating adverse selection.
7These articles only examinefirst-party coveragewhilewe test for selection effects in third-party
liability and first-party coverage.
8Puelz andSnow(1994)didfindapositive relationbetweencoverageand risk.Their result, how-
ever, was subsequently challenged by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne, Gouriéroux,
and Vanasse (2001).While Cohen (2005) did not find any correlation for beginning drivers, she
did find a statistically significant positive relation for experienced drivers.
9If there aremultiple loss levels,Koufopoulos (2007) shows that thepositive correlationproperty
between the level of insurance coverage and accident probability (as opposed to the expected
value of indemnity) may not hold.
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insurance company, they find that unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is much
larger than unobserved heterogeneity in risk. Sandroni and Squintani (2013) study
an equilibrium model with overconfident policyholders and find that unobservable
overconfidence can explain the negative relationship between the level of insurance
coverage and ex post realizations in a competitive market. We refer to Cohen and
Siegelmann (2010) for a review of the empirical literature on asymmetric information
in insurance markets.
We test for the correlation of the generalized residuals based only on the insurance
data alone and fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero residual correlation between
the level of insurance coverage (both third-party liability and first-party) and a sub-
sequent downgrade of the Bonus-Malus class. By adding distance and the driving
factor to the model, we still fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero residual correla-
tion, consistent with the direct evidence that there are no selection effects based on
driving characteristics.
Our article is most closely related to the recent literature that tests for the effects
of multidimensional private information in insurance markets. Finkelstein and Mc-
Garry (2006) use individual-level survey data on long-term care insurance and show
that individuals’ self-reported beliefs of entering a nursing home are positively related
to both subsequent nursing home use and insurance coverage. Despite the existence
of this risk-based selection, actual nursing home use and insurance coverage are not
positively correlated. The authors explain this fact by providing evidence that the
risk-based selection is offset by a selection based on heterogeneous degrees of risk
aversion as proxied by seat belt usage and investment in preventive health care mea-
sures. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) also use individual-level survey data on
Medigap insurance to examine the reasons for the significant negative correlation be-
tween insurance coverage and medical expenditure. They show that cognitive ability
rather than risk preferences is the essential factor explaining this negative relation.
Robinson, Sloan, and Eldred (2018) use survey data of drinkers and drivers includ-
ing risk preferences, driving habits, and subjective assessments of accident risk. They
provide evidence that risk-tolerant policyholders demand less insurance coverage.
This negative correlation between risk-tolerance and coverage is offset by moral haz-
ard, as the overall correlation between ex post accident risk and insurance coverage
is zero.
We contribute to this literature by analyzing a unique data set that is provided by
an independent and unbiased third party, the telematic company. The data contain
detailed information about real decisions and behavior of individuals that is of direct
interest to but unobserved by the insurance company.10 The telematics data allow us
to derive several aspects of driving behavior and test for their relations to contract
choice and risk.
10Responses to survey questions can be biased, in particular, if they relate to self-reported prob-
abilities of future events. Examples include the anchoring bias of unfolding bracket questions
(Hurd et al., 1998; Hurd, 1999) and problems of focal responses (Gan, Hurd, and McFadden,
2005).
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Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) propose an empirical test based on “unused observ-
ables,” that is, on characteristics that are observed by the insurance company but
are not used for pricing, either voluntarily or for legal reasons. They argue that if
those characteristics are significantly related to contract choice and risk, then this
is direct evidence of relevant private information that is not confounded by hid-
den information on risk preferences. In their study of the U.K. annuity market, they
use postcode information that is collected by the insurance company but not used
for pricing. They find that the inhabitants’ socioeconomic characteristics of different
postcode areas are correlated with both survival probability and choice of insurance
coverage. Similarly, Saito (2006) uses postcode information that is collected but not
used by insurance companies for pricing in automobile insurance. The author rejects
the hypothesis that policyholders who live in high-accident-probability regions are
more likely to purchase insurance. Unused but observed data, although not used
in pricing, might be used in other types of underwriting activities by the insurance
company. For example, policyholders who observably differ in their underlying risk
might be offered different contracts, might be scrutinized differently in the claims set-
tlement process, or might face different renewal or cancellation policies. In that case,
a significant relation between the “unused observable” and contract choice might re-
flect those different underwriting policies. The telematic data set provides us with
information that is unobserved by the insurance company. Thus, the insurance com-
pany is not able to condition any type of underwriting or cancellation activity on
that information.
Most of the empirical literature testing for the effects of private information in in-
surance markets is based on a data set of a single insurance company. Salanié (2017)
highlights that one has to be cautious in interpreting the results within a market equi-
librium. For example, if different insurers specialize in attracting different risk types
with different contracts, then we might not observe selection effects within a single
insurer, but there might be selection effects across different insurers. While our anal-
ysis is also based on the data of a single insurer, this insurer was the first and only
company offering a pay-as-you-drive contract to the overallmarket at that time. Thus,
our data are the marketwide data of pay-as-you-drive insurance contracts.
Last, our setting further benefits from the fact that liability insurance is mandatory
and policyholders who are rejected by insurers are distributed evenly among all in-
surance companies in the market. This is particularly important as Hendren (2013)
finds more private information held by individuals who are rejected by insurance
companies compared to nonrejectees. This can explain the lack of significant results
of the previous literature on the existence of private information in insurancemarkets.
The article is structured as follows. The “Background and Data” section provides
detailed information about the pay-as-you-drive insurance contract, and about the
telematic and insurance data sets. In the “Econometric Model” section, we specify
the econometric model and provide details on how we account for endogeneity and
sample selection using weather conditions as instruments. We present empirical re-
sults, perform robustness tests, and discuss our main findings in the “Results and
Discussion” section.
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Background and Data
The insurance company offers a pay-as-you-drive insurance contract in addition to
its existing car insurance contract. Cars insured under this contract are equipped
with a telematic device that uses GPS. The pricing of this pay-as-you-drive contract
is based on the aggregate distance driven—fewer kilometers driven imply a lower
premium—and on the road type used.11 The company distinguishes between three
road types: urban, country road, andmotorway. The distance driven on country roads
and motorways is scaled down by a factor of 0.8. Furthermore, policyholders who
choose the pay-as-you-drive contract get a 5 percent discount on the premium of
full comprehensive insurance coverage. In addition to the pay-as-you-drive feature,
the telematic device is equipped with an emergency device and a crash sensor. If
activated, either by the car driver or in case of an accident, an emergency signal is sent
to the help desk of the insurance company. The help desk will then try to contact the
policyholder and call emergency services if needed or if the policyholder cannot be
reached. An additional benefit of the telematic device is that stolen cars can be tracked
via GPS. Policyholders pay a one-time fee for the installation of the telematic device
and a monthly fee for the safety services.
As policyholders can choose this pay-as-you-drive contract, analyzing the relations
between coverage choice, risk, and driving behavior (as well other factors) using only
data for those who opted for this contract may lead to a sample-selection bias. We
use Heckman’s approach12 to account for a potential selection bias, using additional
data for policyholders who did not choose this contract. The empirical results show
that the pay-as-you-drive contract is more likely to be chosen by younger, female
policyholders living in urban and/or wealthier areas, who drive old(er) and/or more
valuable cars with less engine power.
The economic rationale for pay-as-you-drive insurance contracts is the internalization
of accident and congestion externalities. Edlin andKaraca-Mandic (2006) estimate that
the externality cost due to an additional driver in California is around $1,725 to $3,239
per year. Vickrey (1968) proposes the idea of “distance-based pricing” as a solution to
the externality problem. In theUnited States,many insurance companies, for example,
Progressive, Allstate, and State Farm, offer pay-as-you-drive insurance contracts for
privately owned cars. Liberty Mutual offers pay-how-you-drive insurance contracts
for fleets. Edlin (2003) argues that monitoring costs for mileage-based pricing might
be too high and suggests that regulatory enforcement could be necessary as private
gains might be much smaller than social gains. Bordoff and Noel (2008) estimate that
a U.S. nationwide implementation of pay-as-you-drive insurance would result in a 8
percent reduction of mileage driven, which would yield a social benefit of $50 billion
per year, a reduction of carbon dioxide emission by 2 percent, and a reduction of oil
11For a total distance of up to 4,000 km (2,485miles) per year, the premium for liability and com-
prehensive insurance is reduced by 25 percent, between 4,000 km (2,485 miles) and 6,000 km
(3,728 miles) by 20 percent, between 6,000 km (3,728 miles) and 8,000 km (4,971 miles) by 15
percent, and between 8,000 km (4,971 miles) and 10,000 km (6,214 miles) by 10 percent.
12We use a modified version of Heckman’s approach because we also address endogeneity in
the equations of interest.
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consumption by 4 percent. They also estimate that two-thirds of all householdswould
pay a lower premium under pay-as-you-drive insurance with an average saving of
$270 per car per year. Parry (2005) shows that the welfare gains of implementing
pay-as-you-drive insurance in reducing driving-related externalities are much larger
compared to the welfare gains obtained by increasing gasoline tax.
Due to the safety features of telematic devices, the EuropeanCommission has passed a
recommendation supporting the EU-wide implementation of a telematic-based emer-
gency call (eCall) service for the transmission of in-vehicle emergency calls (European
Commission, 2011). This service ismandatory for all new cars sinceApril 2018. Several
automobile manufacturers equip their cars with telematic units and offer various ad-
ditional services to their customers, for example, automatic crash response and stolen
vehicle tracking.
Telematic Data
An independent telematic company develops the hardware and collects andmanages
the telematic data. Each data point includes date, time, GPS coordinates, direction of
driving, current speed, distance driven since the last data point, ignition status of the
engine, and road type (urban, country road, or motorway). A data point is recorded
when the engine is started, after approximately every 2 km (1.24 miles) driven, and
when the engine is switchedoff.Ourdata set covers 2,340 cars for a periodof 3months,
fromFebruary 1, 2009, toApril 30, 2009, comprising 3.7million individual data points.
We restrict the data set to car rides where a definitive start and end were recorded.
Moreover, we exclude car rides with unrealistically high values of speed (above
200 km/h= 124.27 mph, which is above the 99.9 percent quantile of the empirical
distribution) and of distances between data points (above the 99.9 percent quantile).
The excluded car rides are likely to result from a connection failure with the GPS
satellite.13 These exclusions leave uswith 3.15million data points. Table 1 displays the
summary statistics of the telematic data. The average total distancedrivenby eachpol-
icyholder within the 3-month period is 2,061 km (1,281 miles), which translates into a
yearly average of 8,212 km (5,103miles). Based ondata from the local automobile club,
the nationwide average yearly distance driven per driver is 13,140 km (8,165 miles).
Thus, policyholders of the telematic insurance contract drive less than the nationwide
average. This suggests a selection effect that may be due to the distance-dependent
discount offered by the contract or other effects. As noted above, we are going to
account for a potential selection bias.
In order tomeasure the risk type of an insured personwe use the total distance driven,
the number of car rides, the interaction among the latter two,14 and average speeding
13Most of those excluded car rides reveal further unrealistic characteristics such as speed above
200 km/h (124 mph) at the time the engine is switched on or off, or at the only data point in
between, or in urban areas.
14This interaction accounts for various driving patterns (e.g., an urban driver typically drives
more frequently but shorter distances) and experience (e.g., a policyholder who drives a lot
of long-distance car rides may have more driving experience).
8 The Journal of Risk and Insurance
Table 1
Summary Statistics of Telematic Data
Road Type
Urban Country Motorway All
Number of cars 2,340
Number of car rides 537,181
Speed (mph) Mean 29.7 45.9 70.4 48.5
Stdev 11.8 14.0 14.9 22.2
Distance/ride (miles) Mean 5.6
Stdev 11.3
Distance/car (miles) Mean 544 325 496 1,281
Stdev 461 394 686 1,221





i∈n (vij − uj)
n
, (1)
where j is the road type (urban, country, motorway), uj is the countrywide legal speed
limit for road type j in km/h (urban: 50 km/h= 31.07mph, country: 100 km/h= 62.14
mph, motorways: 130 km/h= 80.78 mph), i = 1, . . . ,n is a data point, vij is the speed
of the car at data point i on road type j, and n =
{
i = 1, . . . ,n|vij > uj
}
is the set of
data points at which the speed of the car is above the legal speed limit.15
The insurance company has access only to the telematic data that are necessary for
pricing the pay-as-you-drive contract, that is, to the aggregate distance driven per
road type. The insurer contractually refrains from accessing any other telematic data
because of privacy concerns. The telematic data set thus provides us with detailed
private information about driving behavior that is inaccessible to the insurance com-
pany. This setting allows us to directly test whether private information as reflected
in driving behavior is relevant for the level of insurance coverage and risk.
Insurance Data
For all privately owned cars in the telematic data set, the corresponding insurance
contract data are linked on the car level via an anonymous identification number.
Corporate cars are excluded fromthedata set because insurance coverage isnot chosen
by the driver but by the corporation, and driving behavior may not be comparable to
that of private cars. The insurance data comprise all the information used for pricing
15The countrywide legal speed limits are themaximumspeed limits. The actual legal speed limit
can be lower either permanently, for example, in residential areas or road sections prone to
accidents, or temporarily, for example, due to roadwork or construction sites. We thus might
underestimate the extent to which drivers speed by using the countrywide legal speed limits
for each road type.
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of the policies at the beginning of February 2009. An update of the insurance data set
for February 2010 is used to extract information about the submission of a liability
claim during that year.We therefore restrict the telematic data set to those cars that are
still insured under the pay-as-you-drive contract after one year. Last, only cars with
more than 4 kW (5.4 HP) were included,16 andmotorhomes have been excluded. This
leaves us with 1,847 insurance contracts for analyzing the role of private information
on contract choice and risk.
For each contract we observe or derive the following information to be used in the
empirical analysis:17
 Car-related information: Age, engine power, and catalog price of the car at initial
registration.
As the catalog price may become less informative with increasing age of the car,
we convert the catalog price into an “adjusted price” by using the discount factor
exp{−0.2·age}.18
 Policyholder-related information: Age, gender, postcode, and purchasing power.
The postcode information is used to identify whether the policyholder lives in a
city that can be characterized as urban or not. However, the policyholder is not nec-
essarily the primary driver of the car.19 In order to determine whether the driver
of the car lives in an urban area, we use the GPS coordinates to first identify the
most frequent parking position of a car. We label this position as the “main loca-
tion,” indicating the location where most of the trips start and/or end. In a sec-
ond step, we identify the (nearest) zip code of the main location and use a thresh-
old of 40,000 inhabitants (according to the zip code) to define a dummy variable
“urban.”
The insurance company does not collect income information in the underwriting
process. To control for income in our analysis, we use aggregate data on purchasing
power for 2009.20 It is defined as yearly gross income minus direct taxes and social
security contributions plus interest earnings and transfer payments in terms of an
average on the postcode level.Wemerge the average purchasing power per resident
with the insurance data set through the postcode information.
16All cars with 4 kW (5.4 HP) or less are micro-cars, which are license-exempt vehicles with a
maximum speed of 45 km/h (28 mph). The driving behavior of a micro-car is closer to the
driving behavior of a moped than to that of a car.
17This information is available for the 1,847 clients who opted for the pay-as-you-drive contract
as well as for 1,987 clients who did not (except for location-based data).
18This resolves the issue that the catalogprice is highly correlated (above 0.9)with enginepower,
while the correlation of the adjusted price with the catalog price is about 0.7, and with the
car’s age about −0.65.
19The insurance contract covers every person that drives the car with the approval of the poli-
cyholder.
20The purchasing power data were provided by the Austrian Institute for SME Research.
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 Bonus-Malus rating information: Premiums for third-party liability insurance
are based on an experience-rating scheme.21 There are 19 Bonus-Malus classes
that reflect the car owner’s history of claims. Each Bonus-Malus class is related
to a scaling factor of a base premium ranging from 44 percent (lowest class)
to 170 percent (highest class). A car owner with no driving experience starts
with 110 percent of the base premium. If a policyholder does not file a liabil-
ity claim during a year, then she is upgraded one class (“Bonus”) and pays the
next lowest percentage of the base premium in the following year. If a poli-
cyholder files a liability claim during the year, then she is downgraded three
classes (“Malus”) and pays the corresponding higher percentage in the follow-
ing year.22 We use downgrades of the Bonus-Malus record to proxy for ex post risk
(see below).
Considering the current Bonus-Malus class alone does not account for the rat-
ing impact and the associated effects on the premium, which differs depending
on the rating class prior to the down- or upgrade. The (positive or negative) ef-
fects on the premium are a nonmonotonic function of the current level. We ac-
count for this fact in terms of two different variables, measuring the impact on
the premium in percentage points (positive for downgrades, and negative for
upgrades).
 Coverage choice: The insurance company offers three levels of first-party coverage:
none, comprehensive insurance (covers losses from vandalism, theft, weather, etc.),
and full comprehensive insurance (in addition including at-fault collision losses).23
In the empirical analysis we distinguish contracts that cover at-fault losses (full
comprehensive insurance) from those that do not.
Two levels of third-party liability coverage are offered by the insurance company,
which are both in excess of the minimum level of D 6 million mandated by the
insurance law: D 10 million ($13.9m) and D 15 million ($20.9m).24 In the empir-
ical analysis we distinguish contracts with a high limit from those with a low
limit.
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of car- and policyholder-related data. Full
comprehensive and high liability coverage is on average bought by older policy-
holders and for more recently built and more valuable cars with a stronger engine.
Moreover, customers of full comprehensive and high liability coverage have a better
Bonus-Malues rating.
21Traffic violations do not affect the rating.
22The national insurance association monitors the Bonus-Malus record for each nationwide
registered car owner, which is accessible to all insurance companies.
23We do not use information on deductible choice as the standard deductible of D 300 ($418) is
chosen by more than 99 percent of all policyholders.
24These levels of third-party liability coverage are representative for Europe but very high com-
pared to those offered in the United States. Policyholders in the United States may purchase
additional liability coverage through personal umbrella policies.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics of Car- and Policyholder-Related Data
Pay-As- 3rd-Party 1st-Party BM Rating
You-Drive Coverage Coverage Downgrade
No Yes Low High Other Full No Yes
Speeding Mean 3.1 3.2 3 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2
Stdev 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.1 2 2.3
Drives/day Mean 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.5
Stdev 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1
Distance/day (miles) Mean 19.4 19.4 19.4 17.6 20.3 19.6 17.3
Stdev 14.5 14.9 13.5 14.3 14.5 14.6 12.8
Engine (HP) Mean 60.6 65.0 64.6 65.8 62.3 66.2 65.0 63.8
Stdev 24.4 27.8 28.0 27.1 24.3 29.2 28.1 23.5
Value ($1000) Mean 19.5 22.3 21.7 23.7 12.8 26.7 22.7 17.4
Stdev 15.7 16.8 17.5 15.2 13.4 16.6 17.1 13.4
Age car (years) Mean 4.4 3.5 3.7 3 6.7 1.9 3.3 4.9
Stdev 5 3.7 3.9 3.2 4.2 2.1 3.6 4
Age (years) Mean 51.8 48.7 48.1 49.9 48.1 48.9 48.6 49.2
Stdev 14.7 15.1 14.9 15.5 15.7 14.8 15.1 15
Purchasing power ($1000) Mean 23.8 24.5 24.5 24.4 24.2 24.6 24.5 24.4
Stdev 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 2.9
Male (%) Mean 64.4 61.2 60.9 61.8 61.2 61.2 61 62.9
Urban (%) Mean 32 42.1 43.1 39.8 40 43.1 41.9 45
BM rating (%) Mean 48.7 51.9 52.2 51.2 54.7 50.6 51.8 53
Impact downgrade (pp) Mean 15.6 17 17.3 16.3 18 16.5 16.9 17.6
Impact upgrade (pp) Mean −1.3 −1.9 −2.1 −1.7 −2.5 −1.7 −1.9 −2.1
BM rating downgrade (%) Mean 7.6 7.8 7 9.6 6.6 0 100
Note: Male, urban and BM rating downgrade are binary variables; their means are expressed
in percentage terms; the impact of down- and upgrades is given in percentage points (pp);
statistics are based on 1,847 observations for policyholders who opted for the pay-as-you-drive
contract, except for the first column, which is based on 1,987 clients who did not.
Econometric Model
Econometric Approach
We test for the direct effect of private information on contract choice and risk by
extending the econometric model suggested by Finkelstein and Poterba (2014). Their
model is based on Chiappori and Salanié (2000) who propose the following probit
model for insurance coverage and risk:
Coverage = 1(Xˇc + εc > 0) (2)
Risk = 1(Xˇr + εr > 0), (3)
where X is the vector of all risk-classifying variables used by the insurance company.
Chiappori and Salanié (2000) interpret a nonzero correlation  between the error terms
εc and εr as an indication for the existence and the effect of private information. A
statistically significant positive correlation coefficient is consistent with the classical
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models of adverse selection andmoral hazardwith asymmetric information about one
parameter of the loss distribution (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1974; Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976; Harris and Raviv, 1978; Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979). Chiappori, Jullien, and
Salanié (2006) show that this prediction can be extended to general settings, including,
for example, heterogeneous preferences and multidimensional hidden information
linked with hidden action. However, they point out that the prediction about the
positive relation between the level of insurance coverage and risk might no longer
hold if the degree of risk aversion in combinationwith risk type is private information.
The role of private information and its potential effects are addressed by Finkel-
stein and Poterba (2014) who propose the following extension of Chiappori and
Salanié (2000):
Coverage = 1(Xˇc + Yc + c > 0) (4)
Risk = 1(Xˇr + Yr + r > 0). (5)
Y includes information that is observed or observable but not used by the insurance
company; hence, Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) call the test “unused observables
test.” Under the null hypothesis that there is no private information contained in Y
that is relevant for contract choice and risk (i.e., symmetric information), we have
c = 0 and r = 0. The benefit of this model extension is that the rejection of the null
hypothesis directly provides evidence of relevant private information independent of
the type of asymmetric information. In our context the information Y (the telematic
data) is not observed (and thus unused) by the insurance company but accessible to
the econometrician.
This model specification also has implications for the residual correlation test. Finkel-
stein and Poterba (2014) argue and show that the positive correlation test may fail to
reject the symmetric information hypothesis even in the presence of private informa-
tion about risk type, if there is unobserved heterogeneity in individual preferences.
For example, when risk type is positively correlated with both coverage and risk of
loss, but risk aversion is positively correlatedwith coverage and negatively correlated
with risk of loss, the correlation between c and r may be zero or even negative.
Unlike in Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and all other literature on car insurance that
only considers first-party coverage, policyholders in our data set simultaneously
choose the level of coverage along twodimensions, first-party and third-party liability
coverage. We define the dependent variables of the outcome equations as follows:
 First-party coverage (Cov1stP): We set Cov1stP = 1 if the contract covers at-fault
losses (full comprehensive insurance) and Cov1stP = 0 otherwise.
 Third-party liability coverage (Cov3rdP): We set Cov3rdP = 1 if the upper limit of
third-party liability coverage is high and Cov3rdP = 0 if the upper limit is low.
 Ex post risk of loss (BMDG): We use downgrades of the Bonus-Malus record to
proxy for ex post risk. The dependent variable BMDG is set to 1 if the Bonus-Malus
rating of a policyholder was downgraded within the subsequent year and is set to
0 otherwise.
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We specify the following three (outcome) equations:
Cov3rdP = 1(Xˇ3 + Y3 + ε3 > 0) (6)
Cov1stP = 1(Xˇ1 + Y1 + ε1 > 0) (7)
BMDG = 1(Xˇr + Yr + εr > 0). (8)
X comprises the set of car- and policyholder-related variables that we consider to
determine contract choice and ex post risk. X includes all relevant variables used by
the insurance company for pricing the contract, in particular, the distance driven.
X also includes weather data25 as a potential determinant of the driver’s choice of
coverage and risk of loss. We are not aware that any other study has used weather
information as a potential determinant of contract choice and/or risk. A similar effect
can be expected from using postcode information (as done by Saito, 2006). However,
weather is measured on a metric scale and is thus much better suited to represent
location-related information than the nominal postcode scale.
Y includes the private information that is not observed by the insurance company.
We test the null hypothesis that there is no private information contained in Y that
is relevant for contract choice and risk; that is, we test for 3 = 0, 1 = 0, and/or
r = 0.We then compare thedirect evidence about the relevanceofprivate information
with the results obtained from the residual correlation test suggested by Chiappori
and Salanié (2000). For that purpose, we use generalized residuals ε3, ε1, and εr to
compute the correlation coefficients 3,r and 1,r, both excluding and including the
private information Y.26 Subsequently, we assess whether the conclusions from the
results of the residual correlation test are consistentwith the direct evidencewe derive
from the coefficients in Equations (6)–(8).
Endogeneity and Sample Selection
The unused observables test by Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) has obvi-
ous advantages. The private (unused and unobserved) information enhances
tests for adverse versus advantageous selection compared to the standard
positive correlation test suggested by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). How-
ever, “attributes that are both demand related and correlated with risk of loss”—as Finkel-
stein and Poterba (2014) put it—may be problematic in regression-based tests. The
main econometric challenge with attributes Y satisfying this property is their po-
tential endogeneity. Elements of Y that represent risk type or risk preferences may
both determine contract choice (coverage) and may be affected by contract choice.
For example, drivers having chosen higher coverage may tend to drive riskier, while
drivers knowing about their poor driving abilities may choose higher coverage. In-
cluding endogenous variables in Y leads to inconsistent estimates of  and ˇ, and
invalidates conclusions based on (the correlation between) residuals. Accordingly, it
25Further details on weather data will be provided below.
26As we also include an interaction between rides and distance, we cannot clearly separate
private from nonprivate information. Therefore, we treat the interaction term as private, too.
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may be problematic to use the private information about driving behavior measured
via telematic data. Therefore, we treat speeding, the number of car rides, and the
distance driven as endogenous regressors.
The standard remedy for endogeneity is using instrumental variables (see, e.g.,
Dionne, St-Amour, and Vencatachellum, 2009; Dionne, Michaud, and Pinquet, 2013).
Suitable instruments (1) must be exogeneous, (2) have to be good predictors of the
endogeneous regressors, and (3) must not be included as regressors in the equations
of interest. One can think of instrumental variable (IV) estimation as a two-step pro-
cedure (done by standard estimation methods in a single step). In the first stage, the
potentially endogeneous regressor y ∈ Y is regressed on all other (exogeneous) regres-
sors and the instruments. Subsequently, in the equation of interest (the outcome equa-
tion), the endogenous y is replaced by fitted values yˆ from the first-stage regression.
We address the endogeneity problem by using local, car-related weather conditions
as instruments. Weather conditions observed after the coverage choice, during the
periodwhendriving information is recorded (i.e., February toApril 2009), are suitable
instruments because (1) weather is exogenous, (2) it affects driving behavior, and
(3) weather observed during the 3 months satisfies the exclusion condition, as it is not
relevant for coverage choice and downgrades.27
More specifically, we use data on precipitation (rainfall), snowfall (depth and number
of days), temperature at 7:00am and 2:00pm, visibility (number of foggy and hazy
days), and radiation. We use the average, the minimum, the maximum, and the range
(i.e., the difference between maximum and minimum) over the 3 months, resulting
in a total of 36 measures. We obtain these data from about 150 weather stations and
match themwith themain location of the car.Matching is done by using data from the
weather station with the shortest distance to the main location. To simplify the search
for an appropriate set of instruments, we do not consider the originally observed
weather data but derive and use the three principal components with eigenvalues
greater than one, which are significant predictors in the first stage (see the results
below). It is difficult to summarize the structure of loadings for the three components.
The first factor is primarily associatedwith temperature and the secondwith visibility.
For the third, we find no clear pattern in loadings allowing such associations. In any
case, by using these three components, we efficiently combine information from a
large number of weather measures and also avoid the problem of using too many
instruments.
As noted above, the fourmeasures that characterize driving behavior (speeding, num-
ber of car rides, distance driven, and the interaction between rides and distance) are
treated as endogenous. Accounting for multiple endogenous regressors leads to spe-
cial requirements. The usual concerns associated with weak instruments are exac-
erbated, and the multivariate case has to be treated differently (see Stock, Wright,
and Yogo, 2002). It is necessary to find instruments that can sufficiently differenti-
ate among two or more endogeneous regressors so that the fitted values from the
27We discuss the exclusion condition more comprehensively below.
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first-stage regressions are not highly correlated. As it turns out, it is very difficult
to define instruments with that capability using the available weather data. Instead,
we combine the four endogeneous driving-related measures into a “single” endoge-
neous variable, defined as their first principal component. This component has an
eigenvalue of 2.7, and the loadings of distance driven, the number of car rides and
their interaction are between 0.5 and 0.6. The loading of the speeding index is 0.2. We
interpret this principal component as a driving-based, endogenous risk factor. In the
subsequent analysis we compare results based on using only the distance driven (to-
gether with all other controls) to results based on this driving factor (which includes
both private drivingmeasures and the nonprivate distance). Althoughwe forgo some
interpretability, we avoid the challenge ofmultiple endogenous regressors and the as-
sociated problem of weak instruments.
For the estimation of the three outcome Equations (6), (7), and (8) in combinationwith
sample selection,we followWooldridge (2010, section 19.6).28 Wefirst estimate a selec-
tion equation using data on a sample of 1,987 clients who did not choose the telematic
contract (with the binary dependent variable being zero), and the 1,847 clients who
opted for the telematic contract. The inverseMills ratioderived from this probit regres-
sion is used in all subsequent regressions to avoid a potential sample-selection bias.
We estimate the three outcome equations as separate29 IV-probit models, defining Y
in (6)–(8) as the first principal component of the four driving-based measures.
In the estimation of the selection equation, and the (implicit) first-stage and outcome
equations, we use three different kinds of weather information for three different
purposes:
 Long-runweather data from 1981 to 2010 are used in the two coverage choice Equa-
tions (6) and (7), and weather from 2009 in the BM downgrade Equation (8). It is
plausible to assume that policyholders are aware of typical (local) weather condi-
tions near themain location. Accordingly, theymay account for such circumstances
in their coverage choice. More specifically, we use long-run precipitation matched
with the telematic-based main location of a car in the coverage choice equations.
Differences in local weather conditions may also be responsible for differences in
the likelihood of damages and consequential downgrades. However, it is more ap-
propriate to use weather conditions during 2009 rather than long-run weather data
in the BM downgrade equation, as downgrades reflect rating changes during 2009.
Therefore, we use the first principal component of 36 weather variables measured
in the entire year 2009 in the BM downgrade Equation (8).
28We note that Wooldridge (2010) does not address our case of endogeneity in the “binary”
response equation and remarks that this “is difficult, and it is a useful area of future research”
(p. 814). He also does not account for the case of more than one outcome equation.
29Estimating the three probit equations jointly would imply efficiency gains (which may not be
substantial given the weak correlations among residuals presented below). However, simul-
taneously accounting for endogeneity in the joint estimation is not straightforward. Rather
than obtaining potentially inconsistent results, we prefer to present single-equation estimates
that may be (slightly) inefficient.
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 Weather observed during the 3 months (February, March, and April 2009) while
telematic data are recorded is used to derive three principal components. As de-
scribed above, these are used as instruments to account for the endogeneity of the
driving factor in the IV-probit estimation. Instruments have to satisfy the exclu-
sion condition and thus must not be included in the outcome Equations (6)–(8).
We cannot rule out that (anticipated) weather conditions during these 3 months
may have some relevance for coverage choice, and may have a partial impact on
downgrades. However, we argue that long-runweather conditions (represented by
long-run precipitation) for coverage choice and weather conditions for the entire
year 2009 for downgrades (see the previous bullet point) are better suited as controls
in the outcome equations than the weather observed only during these 3 months.30
 The selection equation requires an exogeneous regressor that is not included in
subsequent equations. Ideally, such a factor should determine the selection of the
pay-as-you-drive contract but should not affect coverage choice and BM down-
grades (see Wooldridge 2010, section 19.6.2). We use the first31 principal compo-
nent of long-run weather measures (e.g., precipitation, temperature, the number
of days with snow, hail or ice) observed over the period 1981–2010, assuming that
this information reflects (exogenous) regional differences that affect sample selec-
tion.32 The choice of the selection instrument is not as critical as in IV estimation.
If it is too weak, the inverse Mills ratio derived from the selection equation may be
too strongly correlatedwith the other regressors subsequently used in the (implicit)
first stage of IV estimation.However, this correlation is attenuated for three reasons:
(1) only (about) half of the sample used in the selection equation is also used in the
subsequent regressions, (2) the inverse Mills ratio is a nonlinear function of fitted
values, and (3), as shown below in Table 3, the weather-based selection instrument
has a significant coefficient in the selection equation.
Results and Discussion
Results
The pay-as-you-drive insurance contract is offered for choice, and the characteristics
of policyholders under this contractmight differ from those that decided not to choose
this contract. The results for the selection equation33 presented in Table 3 show that the
30The correlation of the first of the three “3-month weather” principal components with long-
run precipitation is 0.66 for the subsample of policyholders who chose the pay-as-you-drive
contract. Its correlation with the “weather 2009” component is 0.77. These correlations do not
seem too high, given the conceptual differences between those measures.
31The first component has an eigenvalue of 3.9. All other components have eigenvalues less
than 1.0.
32In the selection equationweuse this principal component as an instrumentwhilewe use long-
run precipitation in the outcome Equations (6) and (7) as a determinant of coverage choice.
The correlation between long-run precipitation and the first principal component of long-run
weather is 0.58 for all data (compared to 0.66 for the subsample of policyholders who chose
the pay-as-you-drive contract). The correlation between long-run precipitation and the first
of the three “3-month weather” components is 0.73 using all data.
33Because we use different controls in the outcome equations for coverage and for BM down-
grades, we estimate two, slightly different, selection equations.
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Table 3
Selection Equations
Bonus-Malus First- and Third-
Downgrade Party Coverage
Coef z-Stats Coef z-Stats
Log HP −0.663 −6.2 −0.670 −6.3
Log adjusted price 1.119 17.8 1.104 17.7
Log age car 0.866 14.6 0.859 14.6
Gender (male=1) −0.153 −3.0 −0.161 −3.1
Age −0.016 −9.3 −0.016 −9.5
BM rating 2.890 6.9 2.932 7.0
Impact downgrade 5.021 8.0 4.851 7.8
Impact upgrade −1.274 −1.0 −1.203 −1.0
Urban 0.370 6.3 0.436 7.4
Log purchasing power 0.976 5.1 0.906 4.7
Note: Probit regression; dependent variable= 1 if pay-as-you-drive contract has been chosen;
columns 2 and 3 report results for the equation used to compute the inverse Mills ratio for the
BMDG equation; columns 4 and 5 for the coverage outcome equations; N = 3,834; pseudo R2:
0.27 and 0.28; robust standard errors are used to compute z-statistics.
pay-as-you-drive contract ismore likely tobe chosenbyyounger, femalepolicyholders
living in urban and/or wealthier areas, who drive old(er) and/or more valuable cars
with less engine power. The pay-as-you-drive contract is alsomore likely to be chosen
by policyholders whose current Bonus-Malus rating is high (indicating high risk),
and whose premium is more strongly affected by a potential downgrade. A potential
upgrade has no significant effect.
In Table 4 we summarize results related to weather variables. Long-run weather, rep-
resented by the first principal component of various long-run weather measures, is
found to be a significant regressor in the selection equations, justifying its use as an
instrument for this purpose.34 In Table 4 we only present the weather-related part of
first-stage IV estimation results. For the treatment of endogeneity, it is important that
the coefficients of 3-month weather instruments are significant. The second principal
component is insignificant, but only in the first stage of the BM downgrade equa-
tion. Overall, however, the instruments can be considered to be strong, given their
F-statistics are above 25 (i.e., above the typical threshold 10; see Stock, Wright, and
Yogo, 2002), and partial R2s are around 0.04.
Wenow turn to themain results of our study. Table 5 presents the estimates of the three
outcome questions. For each binary dependent variable, we present two regression
34The principal component of long-run weather is not used in subsequent regressions to sat-
isfy the exclusion condition. The other weather-related regressors have to be included in
the selection equation because they are subsequently used in the outcome equations and as
instruments for treating endogeneity.
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Table 4
z-Statistics of Weather Variables in Selection Equations and First-Stage IV Regressions
First-Stage of IV Estimation
Selection Eqn Distance Driving Factor
BMDG Coverage BMDG Coverage BMDG Coverage
Long-run weather pc −2.3 −4.3
3-month weather pc1 7.0 3.8 −5.3 −5.1 −4.1 −3.5
3-month weather pc2 6.4 4.3 1.4 2.4 1.5 2.6
3-month weather pc3 6.8 7.2 −4.1 −4.0 −6.0 −5.8
Long-run precipitation −4.5 −0.4 1.2
Weather 2009 pc −8.3 1.4 2.4
Note:Robust z-statistics associatedwithweathervariables in the selection equations (binarypro-
bitwith the samedependent variable as inTable 3), and thefirst-stage IV regressions (dependent
variables are distance and the driving factor); we only present z-statistics because coefficients
of principal components have no meaning; results for other regressors can be found in Table 3,
or have been omitted for brevity.
results. Thefirst regression includes onlydistance as adriving-based regressor that the
insurance company observes and includes in the pricing scheme. In the second regres-
sion, we include the driving factor that summarizes information about the distance
driven, the number of car rides, the interaction between these two, and the speeding
index.35 This driving factor is based on information that is private to the car driver
(and to us), but also includes distance, the nonprivate information observed and used
by the insurance company. We treat endogeneity of both driving-based regressors,
distance and the driving factor, with three instruments.
From the column “BM Downgrade” in Table 5, we infer that both distance and the
driving factor have a positive effect on a downgrade of the BM rating class. While the
signs of the coefficients are suggestive of distance anddriving factor being risk factors,
the z-statistics of 1.0 and 1.3, respectively, are close to but below the usual critical
values.
Regarding the effect of the two driving-based regressors on insurance coverage (see
the columns “3rd-Party Coverage” and “1st-Party Coverage”), the signs indicate a
negative effect on third-party liability coverage (indicating advantageous selection)
and a positive effect on first-party coverage (indicating adverse selection). However,
the coefficients are all insignificant (the z-statistics are even lower than the ones for
“BM Downgrade”). In summary, the effects of the driving factor (based on private
information)onBMdowngradeandcoverage choicedonotprovideempirical support
for either advantageous or adverse selection.
35According to a standard setting of principal components analysis, the variance of each com-
ponent is equal to its eigenvalue.We scale the driving factor such that it has the same variance
as distance, thus making its coefficients in Table 5 comparable to those of distance in the first
row.
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We now turn to analyzing the correlation among generalized residuals. Table 6
presents correlations and associated p-values between coverage choice (both third-
party liability and first-party) and risk (BM downgrade) for three models. The first
model (1), is a baseline model that serves as a benchmark. We derive the generalized
residuals in this model from a probit model that only includes nondriving-based in-
formation in each outcome equation; that is, neither distance nor the driving factor
is included. In the second model (2) and in third model (3), we then add distance
and the driving factor, respectively, as regressors to the baseline model and derive the
generalized residuals accordingly.
The results of the baseline model (1) show that the correlations between coverage and
risk are not statistically significantly different from zero.36 Following Chiappori and
Salanié (2000), we would interpret these results as evidence for the absence of private
and relevant information.
The fact that this result does not change when adding distance (model (2)) and the
driving factor (model (3)) as regressors is consistentwith our results in Table 5.We can
interpret the correlations between the generalized residuals of models (2) and (3) as
measures for the link between coverage choice and risk, after nonprivate information
about distance and private driving-based information has been removed. However,
neither distance nor the driving factor show a statistically significant effect on risk and
on coverage choice. Therefore, the signs and significance of the correlations among
the generalized residuals should not and do not change when adding distance or the
driving factor as regressors.
In addition to testing for asymmetric information based on residual correla-
tions, we have also applied the test suggested by Dionne, Michaud, and Pin-
quet (2013); that is, we have estimated their Equation (1) for both first- and
third-party coverage choice. The coefficient of BM downgrades ( in their arti-
cle) is insignificantly negative for Cov3rdP (p-value 0.9) and insignificantly posi-
tive for Cov1stP (p-value 0.2). Thus, signs and significance correspond to the ev-
idence provided in Table 6 and also indicate the absence of residual asymmetric
information.
Wefinally comment on some further results,which arenotdirectly related to the role of
private information, adverse/advantegeous selection and moral hazard. Most of the
effects of controls in Table 5 have the expected signs, and some are highly significant
(notably, the age of cars in the BM downgrade equation). The higher the increase in
the premium in case of (a potential future) downgrade, the less third-party coverage is
demanded. The latter effect can be interpreted as the result of financial considerations.
We find significant weather-related effects only in the coverage choice equations; the
demand for first- and third-party coverage increases with long-run precipitation. The
coefficients associated with engine power, the price of a car, and age in the first-party
36The signs suggest a negative correlation between third-party liability coverage and risk, and
a positive correlation between first-party coverage and risk.
Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Driving Behavior 21
Table 6
Correlations Among Generalized Residuals
(1) (2) (3)
W/o Driving Only Distance Driving Factor
Information Added Added
 p-Value  p-Value  p-Value
Cov3rdP and BMDG −0.001 0.952 −0.014 0.543 −0.015 0.526
Cov1stP and BMDG 0.036 0.112 0.034 0.120 0.035 0.108
Note: Correlations are based on generalized residuals derived from the outcome equations in
Table 5 (except column (1)). We report the associated p-value of the 2 test statistic W used by
Chiappori and Salanié (2000).
choice equation are highly significant, indicating that this choice is primarily driven
by these factors.37
Purchasing power has the expected positive and significant coefficient in first-party
coverage choice. A better measure for income (with more variation than purchasing
power; see Table 2) and/or a better match with the policyholder would be preferable.
This could potentially make a difference to the insignificant negative effect in the
third-party coverage equation. It may also be the case that other regressors measured
on an individual level, for instance, the impact of a BM downgrade, are picking up
financial aspects in third-party coverage choice better than purchasing power.
We finally note that the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is significantly positive
(withap-valueof ≈0.05) in theBMdowngradeequation, butnot in the coverage choice
equations. This indicates that policyholders who are more likely to be downgraded
tend to have chosen the pay-as-you-drive contract, while there are no sample selection
effects with respect to coverage choice.
Robustness Checks
As discussed in the section on endogeneity, the distinction between nonprivate and
private driving-related information is a conceptually important yet empirically subtle
point. Therefore, we combine all (endogeneous) driving-based measures into a single
factor. In order to obtain some insights into the relative importance of its components,
we also consider other combinations of the driving measures.
Weobtain the distance&rides factor by combiningdistance (which always has to be in-
cluded as it is nonprivate information observed and used by the insurance company)
with the number of rides and the interaction term (eachwith about the same loading).
37The rather large coefficients reflect the similar role of these regressors, and are not due to
strong multicollinearity. The correlation between the log of adjusted price and the log of car
age is −0.76; the correlation between log of HP and log of adjusted price is 0.53. The negative
coefficient of engine power may reflect the effects of different car brands.
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Table 7
Estimates for Alternative Driving-Based Factors, but Using Alternative Methods to Define
Instruments
BMDG Cov3rdP Cov1stP
Coef z Coef z Coef z
distance 0.356 0.96 −0.148 −0.70 0.050 0.17
driving factor 0.435 1.34 −0.168 −0.85 0.036 0.13
distance&rides factor 0.491 1.65 −0.175 −0.89 0.038 0.14
distance&speeding factor 0.309 0.44 −0.191 −0.64 0.000 0.00
distance&placebo factor 0.408 0.95 −0.172 −0.72 0.052 0.15
driving factor using
stepwise 0.525 (2.0) −0.098 −(1.2) −0.045 −(0.4)
lasso 0.445 (1.4) −0.134 −(1.6) 0.057 (0.5)
Note: The rows “distance” and “driving factor” are copied from Table 5. The estimates in row
“distance&placebo factor” are averages from 200 simulation runs. This factor consists of ob-
served distance and a placebo private driving measure that is uncorrelated with all outcome
variables. The estimates in the rows “stepwise” and “lasso” are based on a two-stage instru-
mental variable procedure that does not provide correct standard errors. Therefore, z-statistics
are too large (in absolute terms) and put in parentheses.
We also combine distance with the speeding index to obtain the distance&speeding
factor (using the same loadings for both variables).38 The row “distance&rides fac-
tor” in Table 7 indicates that excluding speeding from the set of endogenous driving
measures results in a larger coefficient and z-statistic of this factor compared to the
driving factor in the BM downgrade equation. The results in the other two equa-
tions remain unaffected. The attenuating role of speeding is confirmed in the row
“distance&speeding factor,” which shows that this driving-based factor is not signif-
icant at all.
One may be concerned that the role of the nonprivate measure “distance” in the
driving factor is too strong to find something potentially important about the private
information. The correlation between the principal component score (i.e., the driving
factor) and the observed distance is 0.9. The loading of distance on this principal
component is 0.5, which implies that the relative weight of distance in the linear
combination constituting the driving factor is 0.3. Rather than judging whether or not
these values are (too) high or low (enough), we ask whether correlations, loadings,
andweights really indicate whether the private information embedded in the driving
factor is sufficiently different from the nonprivate information to be convincing.
To answer this question,we carry out a placebo test.Weuse the samedata set as above,
retain all variables, apply the same estimation procedure (accounting for sample se-
lection and endogeneity), and add a simulated standard normal random variable.
For the placebo test, we construct a driving factor that consists of distance and the
38We again scale the driving factors such that they have the same variance as distance to make
the coefficients of driving factors in Table 7 comparable to those of distance in the first row.
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placebo. This distance&placebo factor is simulated such that it has a correlation of 0.9
with observed distance (i.e., the same correlation as between distance and the driv-
ing factor used above). The artificial variable included in this factor is exogeneous
and uncorrelated with BM downgrades and coverage choice. It has no ex ante (eco-
nomic) support and should be irrelevant for risk classification. Hence, including such
pseudo-private information in the analysis should not change the significance of the
driving factor in the outcome equations. Upon comparing the results in the first two
rows of Table 7 (copied from Table 5) to the row “distance&placebo factor,” we find
that the z-statistics from the placebo test are very similar to the first row (“distance”),
and the coefficients from the placebo test are comparable to the coefficients in the sec-
ond row (“driving factor”).39 A similar stability holds for the correlations reported in
Table 6.
Hence, a driving factor that includes irrelevant private information does not make
a difference even though it is highly correlated with its nonprivate constituent “dis-
tance.” In contrast, the results change when considering the driving factor we con-
struct by adding private information (i.e., number of rides and speeding). Compare
the z-statistic of the driving factor in the BMdowngrade equation 1.34 to the z-statistic
of distance alone (0.96 in the first row of Table 7). The significance does change upon
adding ex ante relevant private information. Hence, there appears to be sufficient ad-
ditional private information in the driving factor that is related to downgrades more
systematically thandistance alone.40 This view is supported by considering the results
for the factor that is basedononlydistance and thenumber of rides. The significance of
the distance&rides factor increases even further (the z-statistic in the BM downgrade
equation is 1.65). Conversely, constructing a driving factor by adding speeding to dis-
tance results in an insignificant coefficient in the downgrade equation. This indicates
rather noisy and unsystematic information conveyed by speeding, which deteriorates
the risk classification ability of distance and/or distance and rides. Given the results
from the placebo test, we conclude that observed changes in significance are not an
artifact of multicollinearity, and there is sufficient potential for the unobserved parts
of driving behavior to be important.
So far we have used instruments defined as the principal components of weather
measures observed during the 3 months while driving was observed. In addition, we
have also considered other methods that all aim at extracting predictive information
from a large number of regressorswhile reducing the risk of overfitting.We consider a
stepwise selection procedure, and the lasso approach suggested by Tibshirani (1996).
The last two rows in Table 7, which correspond to these two approaches, confirm
the results obtained in Table 5. The driving factor has a (weak) positive effect on
BM downgrades, a weak(er) negative effect on third-party coverage, and no effect on
first-party coverage.
39Note that we treat the distance&placebo factor in the same way as the (endogenous) driving
factor. However, the placebo component in this factor is exogeneous, and we cannot expect
its coefficients to be very similar to those of the driving factor.
40An increase in the significance indicates an improved risk classification ability when addi-
tional private information is accounted for.
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The first principal component of weather observed in 2009 has been considered as a
potentially relevant factor for BM downgrades. The results in Table 5 indicate, how-
ever, that it is not significant. At the same time, we obtain significant coefficients for
long-run precipitation in both coverage choice equations. Therefore, we have also
specified BM downgrade equations using precipitation from 2009 and/or other indi-
vidual measures of weather observed in 2009. However, no such attempt has resulted
in significant coefficients for 2009 weather variables in that equation.
Conclusion and Discussion
We use a unique data set of driving behaviors to test whether private information
in driving characteristics has significant effects on contract choice and/or risk. The
data set is unique in several ways. First, it provides detailed GPS information about
the position and movement of cars. Second, with the exception of distance driven,
the data are not accessible to the insurance company. The data thus provide us with
the opportunity to directly test the relevance of private information that results from
car drivers’ actions that are relevant to but not observed by the insurance company.
Third, the data represent all pay-as-you-drive insurance contracts on the market at
that time.
Moreover, we contribute to the literature by applying amethodological framework to
account for sample selection effects and endogeneity.Weuse localweather conditions,
matched to the location of cars, as instrumental variables. Thereby,wemake it possible
to disentangle adverse selection and moral hazard effects.
We define a driving factor that includes overall distance driven (known to the insur-
ance company), as well as the number of car rides and speeding (private information
not accessible by the insurer). We find evidence that “additionally” including pri-
vate information in a driving factor affects a downgrade of the Bonus-Malus class
more strongly than nonprivate distance alone. At the same time, none of the driving
characteristics affect policyholders’ contract choice.
In their survey article, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) list several reasons that might
explain the absence of selection effects despite the existence of private information.
For example, policyholders might not be aware of their informational advantage; that
is, they do not know how their driving behavior affects accident risk and thus do not
sort into different contracts.
In the context of driving and insurance purchase decisions, an additional explanation
might be that individuals’ decisions regarding financial risk taking (purchasing insur-
ance to avoid losses) need not be systematically related to their decisions regarding
nonfinancial risk taking (driving carefully to avoid accidents).
Salminen and Heiskoanen (1997) present evidence that there are differences in the
degree to which individuals are exposed to different types of nonfinancial risks,
such as traffic, occupational, or home accidents. Moreover, Einav et al. (2012) show
that there are differences in risk preferences for financial risks across different do-
mains, such as insurance and asset allocation. Thus, there might be even larger
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differences in how individuals deal with financial (insurance) versus nonfinancial
(automobile) risks. Some individuals might be much more willing to avoid nonfi-
nancial risks by driving very carefully while they are less willing to insure financial
risks by purchasing automobile insurance, and vice versa. Consistent with our re-
sults, driving behaviormight therefore have little relevance for the choice of insurance
contracts.
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